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Myanmar’s Ultimatum: Is Myanmar the Next Frontier of Sino-US Conflict?

Oct 29
5 min read
Protest in Myanmar against Myanmar's military, known as the Tatmadaw, following the military coup of 1 February 2021. Photograph dated 14 February 2021 by MgHla, via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0). https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
Protest in Myanmar against Myanmar's military, known as the Tatmadaw, following the military coup of 1 February 2021. Photograph dated 14 February 2021 by MgHla, via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0). https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

Myanmar has been largely obscured from the eye of global politics for the best part of eighty years, the legacy of colonialism led Myanmar down a route of steadfast nationalism. Since then, the nation has been stuck in a monotonous cycle of power obsessed military dictatorships, devolving the nation and plunging it into decades of civil war. 


Myanmar’s pioneering military dictator was General Ne Win, rising to power in 1962 through a coup, he withdrew Myanmar from the international stage and incentivised an already unrelenting civil war through an intense regime of ethnic oppression. The often-depraved actions of the military junta and Myanmar’s new policy of isolationism meant it arrived in 1988, at the end of Ne Win’s rule, sapped of any close allies or alignment. This is still much the story today; potential partners are forced to grapple with the reputation of the military regime and the lucrative offerings of the nation.


China was one of the only nations willing to take an early gamble, coveting access to the Bay of Bengal and the exploitation of the nation’s rich natural resources, Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Rangoon in 1978 was signal of intent for the growing superpower. With the pressures of funding the busy schedule of the armed forces and the pinch of Western sanctions, the leader of the Tatmadaw, Saw Maung, sought to reciprocate Beijing’s flirtations as the nation struggled for stability. Seeing no issue in aligning with the quasi-fascist military dictatorship, Li Peng lined up a billion-dollar arms deal with Myanmar opening the door for Chinese investment. 


Initially, China bolstered the Tatmadaw’s position in power; after refusing to recognise the victory of the National League for Democracy in the long-awaited 1990 election, the military needed all the help it could muster to squash the domestic unrest. China would further bolster Myanmar’s infrastructure, building railways, roads, pipelines and bridges to consolidate their foothold in the region and open trade routes, á la the Silk Road of past dynasties. By 2010 China had announced itself as Myanmar’s closest aide and in exchange for the support of Beijing, who bankrolled the Tatmadaw and defended them at the UN over its human rights abuses, oil and gas pipelines from Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal would open and China would establish an overwhelming presence in the local mining industry.


However, concerns over Myanmar’s growing reliance on Chinese support and the crippling Western sanctions began to worry the military, encouraging a policy of reproachment with the US to try and shake the ever more claustrophobic presence of Beijing and balance their global reputation. While not explicitly worried of Myanmar’s close relationship with China, the US nevertheless saw an opportunity to pull another nation away from the East. State visits from Barrack Obama and Hillary Clinton, plus the re-establishment of mutual embassies marked a new peak in the relationship. Chinese investment slowed and Washington championed Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic party after their electoral triumph in 2016, easing sanctions and seemingly pushing Myanmar back on an imperfect path to recovery, restoration and of course, democracy.


As ever though, the question of the military still loomed, having reserved much of the nation’s parliamentary power after the 2016 election, Aung San Suu Kyi and her party were more or less powerless in practice. With no jurisdiction over the direction of the armed forces, the rogue military would begin a genocidal campaign aiming to systematically oust the Rohingya Muslims from the Rakhine State. In response to the human rights abuses, and what had fast become one of the largest refugee crises in recent memory, the US hastily burned the bridges it had built; condemning the military and also the inaction of the Suu Kyi government. 


Opportunistic as ever, China seized the moment, positioning itself as a vanguard for the military at the UN again, this time over accusations of genocide. Later the two nations agreed a landmark trade deal to fortify a Chinese economic corridor through the heart of Myanmar under the Belt and Road initiative. The international see saw had tipped in Beijing’s favour once more. 


China seemed to relish the opportunity to work with Suu Kyi and for once its projects were not threatened by the instability of junta rule. Though, much to the disgruntlement of Xi Jingping the Tatmadaw, now under the stewardship of Min Aung Hlaing, exacted the third military coup in Myanmar since its independence, throwing the leaders of the NLD into exile, house arrest and detention camps. 


Though many in Myanmar initially suspected and blamed Chinese involvement in the 2021 coup, Beijing was enraged and refused to meet with Hlaing upon his request, though tacit cooperation continued. This time though, China would not make the same mistake and let Myanmar slip away. Growing sick of the subversive Hlaing who’s scam centres had been fleecing his citizens for millions along the Northern border, China would use the rebel groups to pull Hlaing back into line. Arming and tacitly supporting Operation 1027, the junta would loose over 200 military outposts to rebel forces and blow the civil war wide open. 


Alongside this, the economy had been tanking since China reasserted its stake, poverty had almost doubled and foreign investment dropped by 90%. Though, not all of this can be attributed to China, the mismanagement of the junta and the complex legacy of the nation all playing their part, it had nevertheless backed the military into a corner again. Hlaing would reiterate in interviews that ‘We do not rely soley on China” showing that, more than anything, China’s campaign to heel the unruly nation had done little but drag up the ill feelings of a decade ago.


Despite the sinking economy and the extractive Chinese presence, the junta managed to deepen it’s hold, converting Hlaing to President (through a suspiciously dominant electoral victory at the start of this year) and taking back control of the civil war. Together, the growing confidence of the junta and the weariness toward the Chinese presence has opened Myanmar back up to the West. Their last attempt to resolve relations has been described as ‘abortive’ and half-hearted, but it is apparent that Hlaing is looking to avoid the same critiques this time. 



It seems to set up a decidedly intense ultimatum for the nation. If they commit to cozying up to the lucrative proposals of the US, what will China do? It certainly has the power to topple the regime, as seen Chinese influence stretches far beyond surface level and despite the claims of Hlaing, Myanmar very much does rely on Chinese backing. The US presence seems to throw that arrangement into question, Washington looking for a way to ‘engage Myanmar without war or isolation and loosen China's grip on critical minerals, aligning peace with American interests’ and Rangoon seemingly looking for a way out. Is it therefore more so an ultimatum for Washington? The junta seems to want out, and it is not as if this Trump government is afraid dragging up old rivalries, it is certainly not concerned by the blood-stained legacy of the junta. So, could this once obscured nation find itself back in the international limelight at the centre of the next Sino-US conflict?



 

 
 
 

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